Relational approaches to personal autonomy

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Individualistic traditions of autonomy have long been critiqued by feminists for their atomistic and asocial presentation of human agents. Relational approaches to autonomy were developed as an alternative to these views. Relational accounts generally capture a more socially informed picture of human agents, and aim to differentiate between social phenomena that are conducive to our agency versus those that pose a hindrance to our agency. In this article, I explore the various relational conceptualizations of autonomy profferred to date. I critically review some of the ongoing internal disputes within the relational autonomy literature, and conclude the article by taking stock of the value of relational autonomy despite these unresolved debates.

OriginalsprogEngelsk
Artikelnummere12916
TidsskriftPhilosophy Compass
Vol/bind18
Udgave nummer5
Antal sider14
ISSN1747-9991
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2023

Bibliografisk note

Funding Information:
I am grateful to receive funding from a Velux foundation grant [Project number: 00026589].

Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 The Authors. Philosophy Compass published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

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