デカルト的な心の概念をめぐるマクダウェルとメルロ=ポンティ

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskning

Standard

デカルト的な心の概念をめぐるマクダウェルとメルロ=ポンティ. / Jensen, Rasmus Thybo.

I: Annual Review of the Phenomenological Association of Japan, Bind 28, 2012, s. 1-10.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskning

Harvard

Jensen, RT 2012, 'デカルト的な心の概念をめぐるマクダウェルとメルロ=ポンティ', Annual Review of the Phenomenological Association of Japan, bind 28, s. 1-10.

APA

Jensen, R. T. (2012). デカルト的な心の概念をめぐるマクダウェルとメルロ=ポンティ. Annual Review of the Phenomenological Association of Japan, 28, 1-10.

Vancouver

Jensen RT. デカルト的な心の概念をめぐるマクダウェルとメルロ=ポンティ. Annual Review of the Phenomenological Association of Japan. 2012;28:1-10.

Author

Jensen, Rasmus Thybo. / デカルト的な心の概念をめぐるマクダウェルとメルロ=ポンティ. I: Annual Review of the Phenomenological Association of Japan. 2012 ; Bind 28. s. 1-10.

Bibtex

@article{ad23d8a1c4ed4b508a86d7187ef89752,
title = "デカルト的な心の概念をめぐるマクダウェルとメルロ=ポンティ",
abstract = "Recently a number of authors have appealed to the early works of Merleau-Ponty in a critique of the picture of perception presented by McDowell. This debate has been focused on McDowell’s claim that conceptual capacities are essentially involved in our perceptual experiences. In this paper I wish to draw attention to what I consider an additional potentially fruitful meeting point between the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and McDowell, namely their critique of a certain Cartesian picture of the mind. My aim is to demonstrate how both authors regard a certain conception of nature rather than some independent epistemological project as the background assumption which gives the Cartesian picture its attraction. Furthermore I want to bring out how they share a general conception of the nature of the problem generated by this background assumption. They both regard the problem as a transcendental problem as opposed to a merely epistemological problem",
keywords = "Det Humanistiske Fakultet, Merleau-Ponty, McDowell, disjunctivism, transcendental argument, cartesiansim",
author = "Jensen, {Rasmus Thybo}",
note = "A version of this paper is to be published in a Japanese translation in the Proceedings of the 2011 Annual Meeting of the Phenomenological Association of Japan.",
year = "2012",
language = "Japansk",
volume = "28",
pages = "1--10",
journal = "Annual Review of the Phenomenological Association of Japan",
publisher = "Phenomenological Association of Japan",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - デカルト的な心の概念をめぐるマクダウェルとメルロ=ポンティ

AU - Jensen, Rasmus Thybo

N1 - A version of this paper is to be published in a Japanese translation in the Proceedings of the 2011 Annual Meeting of the Phenomenological Association of Japan.

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - Recently a number of authors have appealed to the early works of Merleau-Ponty in a critique of the picture of perception presented by McDowell. This debate has been focused on McDowell’s claim that conceptual capacities are essentially involved in our perceptual experiences. In this paper I wish to draw attention to what I consider an additional potentially fruitful meeting point between the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and McDowell, namely their critique of a certain Cartesian picture of the mind. My aim is to demonstrate how both authors regard a certain conception of nature rather than some independent epistemological project as the background assumption which gives the Cartesian picture its attraction. Furthermore I want to bring out how they share a general conception of the nature of the problem generated by this background assumption. They both regard the problem as a transcendental problem as opposed to a merely epistemological problem

AB - Recently a number of authors have appealed to the early works of Merleau-Ponty in a critique of the picture of perception presented by McDowell. This debate has been focused on McDowell’s claim that conceptual capacities are essentially involved in our perceptual experiences. In this paper I wish to draw attention to what I consider an additional potentially fruitful meeting point between the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and McDowell, namely their critique of a certain Cartesian picture of the mind. My aim is to demonstrate how both authors regard a certain conception of nature rather than some independent epistemological project as the background assumption which gives the Cartesian picture its attraction. Furthermore I want to bring out how they share a general conception of the nature of the problem generated by this background assumption. They both regard the problem as a transcendental problem as opposed to a merely epistemological problem

KW - Det Humanistiske Fakultet

KW - Merleau-Ponty

KW - McDowell

KW - disjunctivism

KW - transcendental argument

KW - cartesiansim

M3 - Tidsskriftartikel

VL - 28

SP - 1

EP - 10

JO - Annual Review of the Phenomenological Association of Japan

JF - Annual Review of the Phenomenological Association of Japan

ER -

ID: 38386858