Motor Intentionality and the Case of Schneider
Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › fagfællebedømt
Dokumenter
- Jensen Motor Intentionality and the Case of Schneider
Indsendt manuskript, 261 KB, PDF-dokument
I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational motor intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the one in best accordance both with Merleau-Ponty’s general methodology and with the empirical case of Schneider as it was described by Gelb and Goldstein.
Bidragets oversatte titel | Motorisk Intentionalitet og Tilfældet Schneider |
---|---|
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
Tidsskrift | Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences |
Vol/bind | 8 |
Udgave nummer | 3 |
Sider (fra-til) | 371-388 |
Antal sider | 18 |
ISSN | 1568-7759 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - sep. 2009 |
Antal downloads er baseret på statistik fra Google Scholar og www.ku.dk
Ingen data tilgængelig
ID: 32647394