Group size, signaling and the effect of democracy

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Group size, signaling and the effect of democracy. / Jensen, Thomas; Markussen, Thomas.

I: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Bind 187, 07.2021, s. 258-273.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Jensen, T & Markussen, T 2021, 'Group size, signaling and the effect of democracy', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, bind 187, s. 258-273. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.04.022

APA

Jensen, T., & Markussen, T. (2021). Group size, signaling and the effect of democracy. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 187, 258-273. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.04.022

Vancouver

Jensen T, Markussen T. Group size, signaling and the effect of democracy. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2021 jul.;187:258-273. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.04.022

Author

Jensen, Thomas ; Markussen, Thomas. / Group size, signaling and the effect of democracy. I: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2021 ; Bind 187. s. 258-273.

Bibtex

@article{c4575eabc56f459c9d2759abed190b47,
title = "Group size, signaling and the effect of democracy",
abstract = "A number of papers document that rules governing social dilemmas work better when implemented democratically than when imposed from above (the “effect of democracy”). This paper presents a theoretical model of the effect of democracy and uses laboratory experiments to test a key prediction emerging from the model, namely that the effect of democracy is stronger in small than in large communities. Results from a prisoner's dilemma experiment show that an effect of democracy is present in groups of all sizes but decreases strongly and becomes less persistent as the number of group members increases. In some respects, therefore, democracy appears to work best in small groups.",
keywords = "Democracy, Experiment, Group size, Signaling, Social dilemma, Social preferences, Faculty of Social Sciences, democracy, group size, social dilemma, experiment, social preferences, signaling",
author = "Thomas Jensen and Thomas Markussen",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021 Elsevier B.V.",
year = "2021",
month = jul,
doi = "10.1016/j.jebo.2021.04.022",
language = "English",
volume = "187",
pages = "258--273",
journal = "Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization",
issn = "0167-2681",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Group size, signaling and the effect of democracy

AU - Jensen, Thomas

AU - Markussen, Thomas

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2021 Elsevier B.V.

PY - 2021/7

Y1 - 2021/7

N2 - A number of papers document that rules governing social dilemmas work better when implemented democratically than when imposed from above (the “effect of democracy”). This paper presents a theoretical model of the effect of democracy and uses laboratory experiments to test a key prediction emerging from the model, namely that the effect of democracy is stronger in small than in large communities. Results from a prisoner's dilemma experiment show that an effect of democracy is present in groups of all sizes but decreases strongly and becomes less persistent as the number of group members increases. In some respects, therefore, democracy appears to work best in small groups.

AB - A number of papers document that rules governing social dilemmas work better when implemented democratically than when imposed from above (the “effect of democracy”). This paper presents a theoretical model of the effect of democracy and uses laboratory experiments to test a key prediction emerging from the model, namely that the effect of democracy is stronger in small than in large communities. Results from a prisoner's dilemma experiment show that an effect of democracy is present in groups of all sizes but decreases strongly and becomes less persistent as the number of group members increases. In some respects, therefore, democracy appears to work best in small groups.

KW - Democracy

KW - Experiment

KW - Group size

KW - Signaling

KW - Social dilemma

KW - Social preferences

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - democracy

KW - group size

KW - social dilemma

KW - experiment

KW - social preferences

KW - signaling

U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.04.022

DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.04.022

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85106252225

VL - 187

SP - 258

EP - 273

JO - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

SN - 0167-2681

ER -

ID: 279196865